Leveraging Player Knowledge in Combinatorial Auctions (and Implementation in Surviving Strategies) by Chen, Jing & Micali, Silvio
Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Technical Report
m a s s a c h u s e t t s  i n s t i t u t e  o f  t e c h n o l o g y,  c a m b r i d g e ,  m a  0 213 9  u s a  —  w w w. c s a i l . m i t . e d u
MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-037 June 17, 2008
Leveraging Player Knowledge in 
Combinatorial Auctions (and 
Implementation in Surviving Strategies)
Jing Chen and Silvio Micali
Leveraging Player Knowledge in Combinatorial Auctions
(and Implementation in Surviving Strategies)
Jing Chen and Silvio Micali
June 17, 2008
1
Status Report
More detailed versions of this extended abstract will soon follow.
Our results, solution concepts and models improve on a line of research started by Silvio Micali and
Paul Valiant and called Leveraging Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions. Their result is only available as a
manuscript, as it was submitted but rejected at FOCS 2008.
1 Combinatorial Auctions
Auction Contexts. A combinatorial auction context C consists of a triple (N,G, TV ), where N is the
(finite) set of players, G is the finite set of goods, and TV is a profile (i.e., a vector indexed by the players) of
valuations1 of G, the true valuations. We say that C is a n×m auction context if |N | = n and |G| = m. If
C is such a context, we assume N = {1, . . . , n} and G = {g1, . . . , gm}. As customary, let C be a subset of N ,
we denote the set N\C by −C. (For simplicity, we denote the set N\{i} by −i, instead of −{i}.) Let p be a
profile, we use pC to denote a sub-profile with respect to C, that is, a vector indexed by the players in C.
An outcome Ω for an n×m auction context (N,G, TV ) consists of: (1) an allocation A, that is, a partition
of G into n + 1 subsets, A = (A0, A1, . . . , An), and (2) a price profile P , that is, a profile of real numbers.
We refer to such an Ω as a n×m outcome, and to A0 as the set of unallocated goods. For each player i, we
refer to Ai as the set of goods allocated to i, and to Pi as the price of i. We refer to
∑
i TVi(Ai) as the social
welfare of allocation A, and denote it by SW (A, TV ) —or more simply by SW when TV and A are clear
from context. We refer to
∑
i Pi as the revenue of Ω, and denote it by REV (Ω) —or more simply by REV
when Ω is clear from context.
Player i’s utility function, Ui, is defined as follows: for any context (N,G, TV ) and outcome Ω = (A,P ),
Ui(Ω, TV ) = TVi(Ai) − Pi. When Ω and TV are clear from context, i’s utility refers to the value ui =
Ui(Ω, TV ). (I.e., ui is i’s true valuation on the goods allocated to him minus his price.)
Public Extensive-Form Mechanisms and Auctions. Together with a n × m context C, a n × m
mechanism M yields an auction (C,M). We shall use mechanisms M of public extensive-form. An auction
with such a mechanism M is played in k stages, where k is an integer greater than 1. At each stage j, each
player i publicly announces a string xji simultaneously with the other players. Then M is evaluated on the
profile x, where xi is the sequence x1i , . . . , x
k
i , so as to produce a final outcome. Here, a strategy of a player
i is a deterministic function σi. (A player i chooses σi based on his private inputs; that is, his true valuation
TVi and —as we shall soon see— his knowledge Ki.) For each stage j, σi selects the string x
j
i on inputs (1)
j itself; (2) all strings announced by the players up to stage j − 1 included; and (3) player i’s private inputs.
We refer to a strategy profile σ as a play of (C,M), or M when C is clear. Since a play σ determines the
profile x, it is convenient to view our M as mapping plays σ to outcomes M(σ), and to refer to its allocation
and price component as Ma and Mp: that is, M(σ) = (Ma(σ),Mp(σ)) for all plays σ.
Utilities, Social Welfare, and Revenue. In a play σ of an auction (C,M), i’s utility, ui(σ), is defined
as Ui((Ma(σ),Mp(σ)), TV ). To emphasize player i, we write σ = (σi unionsq σ−i).
When M is probabilistic, the expected social welfare and the expected revenue of a strategy profile
σ, E[SWσ] and E[REVσ], are respectively defined as E[SW (Ma(σ), TV )] and E[REV (Mp(σ))]. Player i’s
expected utility with respect to σ, E[ui(σ)], is defined as E[Ui((Ma(σ),Mp(σ)), TV )]. More simply, we use
E[SW ], E[REV ] and E[ui] respectively, when σ is clear from context.
1A valuation of a set S is a mapping from S’s subsets to the non-negative reals.
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2 Our Notions of Player Knowledge, Collusion, and Implementation
2.1 Our Knowledge Model
At a minimum, each player i knows his own true valuation TVi. But in general, he may have all kinds of
other knowledge, Ki, about the true valuations of the other players. The knowledge that we deem relevant
is the revenue that i could guarantee to himself if he were the seller of the goods to the other players. This
is made more precise as follows.
Definition 1. Let (A,P ) be an outcome for a combinatorial context (N,G, TV ). We say that (A,P ) is
canonical if ∀i ∈ N : (1) Pi is a non-negative integer, and (2) Pi = 0 whenever Ai = ∅. We say that (A,P )
is feasible if it is canonical and Pj ≤ TVj(Aj) whenever Aj 6= ∅.
If (A,P ) is a canonical (respectively, feasible) outcome such that Aj = ∅ whenever j lies outside a given
subset S of the players, we further say that (A,P ) is canonical (respectively, feasible) for S.
Notice that a feasible outcome (A,P ) essentially consists of a way of selling the goods that generates
revenue equal to
∑
j Pj : namely, offer to each player j to either (1) buy bundle Aj for price Pj , or (2) receive
no good and pay nothing. (Receiving positive utility, each player j prefers to accept such an offer to buy.)
Definition 2. Let C = (N,G, TV ) be a combinatorial auction context, and K a profile.
• We say that C has external knowledge K if (1) Ki ⊂ V−i, where V−i is the set of all possible valuation
sub-profiles for the players in −i, and (2) TV−i ∈ Ki.
We refer to Ki as the external knowledge of i. In essence, it represents what player i knows about
the other players true valuations: namely, he knows that TV−i must be one of the sub-profiles in Ki,
but he does not know which one. The external knowledge of i is i’s private information. At least, no
information about Ki is known to the auction designer. (The results of this paper would continue to
hold under a more general definition of K. In particular, players may know also information about
each other’s knowledge. For instance, certain true-valuation information can be common knowledge.)
• By F (Ki) we denote the set of outcomes that are feasible for every valuation sub-profile in Ki.
• By MEWi(K) we define the maximum external welfare known to player i, that is,
MEWi(K) = max
Ω∈F (Ki)
REV (Ω).
Thus, MEWi(K) represents the maximum revenue that i could guarantee if he were in charge to sell
the goods of G to the other players by making each one of them a take-it-or-leave-it offer for some
subset of the goods.
• If S is a subset of the players, the maximum external welfare known to S is defined as
MEWS(K) = max
i∈S
MEWi(K).
For any S, we view MEWS(K) as a function evaluated at K, that is, we view MEWS as a benchmark
of the external knowledge. It is easy to see that MEWS is a player-monotone benchmark (see [?]).
That is, whenevr S ⊂ N ⊂ N ′, MEWS(KN ) ≤MEWS(KN ′), where KN denotes the knowledge profile
of the players in N and KN ′ the knowledge profile of those in N ′.
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2.2 A Very General Collusion Model
In our analysis, we distinguish between independent and collusive players. By contrast, our mechanisms
have no idea of which players are collusive or independent. Indeed, we assume that collusion is “illegal”.
Accordingly, no special bids are envisaged for collusive players, and collusive players have no desire to disclose
themselves. Therefore, our mechanisms produce outcomes specifying allocations and prices treating each
player as independent. But since legal deterrents are often insufficient, we want to design our mechanisms so
as to be robust in the presence of collusion.
When a player i is independent, we have that
1. i’s utility in any outcome (A,P ) indeed coincides with TVi(Ai)− Pi; and
2. i always acts so as to maximize solely his own utility.
When a player is collusive, he may act so as to maximize the collective utility of some subset C of the players
to which he belongs. Several collusion models have been considered in the literature for the utility function
uC of C, as well as for the way C operates. Our results hold in (essentially) all of them. That is, our results
hold for any collusion model satisfying the following “minimal” axiom, satisfied in particular by any model
in which the utility of C is the sum of the utilities of its players.
Minimal Rationality Axiom (MRA): Whenever a player i belongs to a collusive set C, letting (A,P )
and (A′, P ′) two outcomes such that (1) (Aj , Pj) = (A′j , P
′
j) for any j ∈ C \ {i}; and (2) TVi(Ai) − Pi >
TVi(A′i)− P ′i , we have:
uC(A,P ) > uC(A′, P ′).
2.3 Implementation in Surviving Strategies.
Typically, mechanism design aims at guaranteeing a given property P “at equilibrium.” Equilibria, however,
are a fragile notion, because they do not solely depend on the players’ rationality, but also on their beliefs.
In case of a combinatorial auction, saying that a profile of strategies σ is an equilibrium only means that, for
every player i, deviating from σi is an irrational thing to do (i.e., yields a lower utility for i) only if he believes
that any other player j will stick to his strategy σj . Accordingly, if some players believe that the equilibrium
about to be played is σ while others believe it is τ , the auction may not end up in any equilibrium at all,
since “mixing and matching” the strategies of σ and τ needs not to result in an equilibrium!
Accordingly, our mechanism works for a much more robust set of plays: namely,
For any profile of strategies that survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies.
That is, our notion of implementation is ”equilibrium-less,” depends solely on the players’ rationality (rather
than their beliefs), and is immune to any “equilibrium selection” problem.
We formalize this strong notion below, directly for the setting in which the players can both be independent
and collusive. (Our notion improves on that of implementation in undominated strategies of Babaioff, Lavi
and Pavlov, for single-value combinatorial auctions without collusion.)
Definition 3. Let σi be a strategy for player i. We say that σi is dominated if there is another strategy σ′i
for i such that
1. If i is independent, then
• For all strategy sub-profiles σ′−i: E[ui(σi unionsq σ′−i)] ≤ E[ui(σ′)]; and
• For some strategy sub-profile σ′−i: E[ui(σi unionsq σ′−i)] < E[ui(σ′)].
2. If i belongs to a collusive set C, then
• For all strategy sub-profiles σ′−i: E[uC(σi unionsq σ′−i)] ≤ E[uC(σ′)]; and
• For some strategy sub-profile σ′−i: E[uC(σi unionsq σ′−i)] < E[uC(σ′)].
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We say that σi is undominated if it is not dominated.
The following definition is a variant of Definition 60.2 of [?].2
Definition 4. Let Σ be a profile such that Σi is the set of all available strategies for player i, and X be a
profile such that Xi ⊆ Σi for any i. We say that X survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies if
there is a collection (Xt)Tt=0 of profiles such that
1. X0 = Σ and XT = X.
2. Xt+1j ⊆ Xtj for any player j ∈ N and any t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
3. For any t = 0, . . . , T − 1 and any player j ∈ N , every strategy in Xt+1j is undominated over Xt, i.e.,
undominated assuming that for every player i, the set of all available strategies is Xti .
4. For any player j, no action in XTj is dominated over X
T .
Simplifying the Collusion Model. Later on, to simplify the analysis of our mechanism, we assume that
each collusive player i belongs to a single collusive set, and thus use the notation Ci to denote this unique
set, without any confusion. Therefore if another player j belongs to Ci, then Cj = Ci. That is, the collusion
sets together with the set of the independent players form a partition of the player set.
However, we want to emphasize that this assumption is for simplicity only. Our MRA does not require that
every collusive player belongs to only one collusive set, nor does our definition of dominated/undominated
strategies. And our mechanism does not care how the collusive sets are formed, and our theorems hold in
any collusion model where the MRA is satisfied. To prove our theorems in the most general way, we can
refer to player i’s collusion sets as C1i ,C2i , . . . . But doing this significantly complicates our notation and case
analysis, but does not introduce any major conceptual differences.
For notational convenience and uniformity of language, we treat any independent player i as if he were
collusive and his collusive set Ci = {i}. Notice that if our MRA holds before such modification, it continues
to hold after it. Thus this convenient modification leaves our results unchanged.
3 Our Mechanism
Our mechanism is of public extensive-form, and actually consists of three stages: two player stages followed
by a final mechanism stage, where the mechanism produces the final outcome (A,P ).
In the first stage, each player i publicly (and simultaneously with the others) announces (1) a canonical
outcome Ωi for the players in −i; and (2) a subset of goods Si. (Allegedly, Ωi is actually feasible, and indeed
represents the “best way known to i to sell the goods to the other players.” Allegedly too, Si is i’s favorite
subset of goods, that is the one i values the most.)
After the first stage, everyone can compute (a) the revenue Ri of Ωi for each player i, (b) the highest
and second highest of such revenues, respectively denoted by R? and R′, and (c) the player whose announced
outcome has the highest revenue —the lexicographically first player in case of “ties”. Such player is called
the “star player” and is denoted by “?”. (Thus, ? ∈ N .)
In the second stage, each player i, envisioned to receive a non-empty set of goods (for a positive price)
in Ω?, publicly (and simultaneously with the other such players) answers yes or no to the following implicit
question: “are you willing to pay your envisioned price for your envisioned goods?” (The players not receiving
any goods according to Ω? announce the empty string.)
After the second stage, for each asked player i who answers no, the star player is punished with a fine
equal to the price he envisioned for i.
In the third and final stage, the mechanism flips a fair coin. If Heads, S? is given to the star player at
no additional charge (and thus player ? pays nothing altogether if no player says no in the second stage). If
2The difference between the two definitions is in item 3, where they allow Xt+1j to still contain some strategies dominated
over Xt.
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Tails, (1) the goods are sold according to Ω? to the players who answered yes in the second stage, (2) all the
revenue generated by this sale is given to the star player, and (3) the star player additionally pays R′ to the
seller/auctioneer. (Thus, the star player pays only R′ if he has not been fined.)
A more precise description of our mechanism is given below. In it, for convenience, we also include three
“variable-update stages” and mark them by the symbol “•”. In such stages the contents of some public
variables are updated based on the strings announced so far.
Mechanism M
• Set Ai = ∅ and Pi = 0 for each player i.
1. Each player i simultaneously and publicly announces (1) a canonical outcome for −i, Ωi = (A−i, P−i),
and (2) a subset Si of the goods.
• Set: Ri = REV (Ωi) for each player i, ? = arg maxiRi, and R′ = maxi 6=?Ri.
(We shall refer to player ? as the “star player”.)
2. Each player i such that A−?i 6= ∅ simultaneously and publicly announces YES or NO.
• For each player i who announces NO, P? = P? + P−?i .
3. Publicly flip a fair coin.
– If Heads, reset A? = S?.
– If Tails: (1) reset P? = P? + R′; and (2) for each player i who announced YES in Stage 2, reset:
Ai = A−?i , Pi = P
−?
i , and P? = P? − Pi.
Comment. The outcome (A,P ) may not be canonical, as the price of the star player may be non-zero even
though he may receive nothing.
4 Analysis of Our Mechanism
We are now ready to state our main theorem; namely,
Theorem 1. In any surviving play of M for a combinatorial auction context with external knowledge K,
letting I be the set of all independent players, we have:
E[SW ] + E[REV ] ≥ MEWI(K)
2
.
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